Multilateralism Under Fire—But Not Finished

On 14 April, I had the privilege of being invited as a panelist for a webinar provocatively titled “The End of Multilateralism? Strengthening International Organizations Under Siege”, hosted by Diplomats Without Borders and the Caribbean Policy Consortium. The question posed was not an abstract one. For those of us who have spent our careers working within multilateral institutions like the World Trade Organization (WTO), it lands hard.

We are, quite plainly, in a precarious era for global cooperation. And trade—the traditional arena for rules-based multilateralism—is no exception. In fact, it may well be the most threatened.

The WTO has long stood as the legal and political bedrock of the international trading system. Its core principles—reciprocity, Most-Favoured Nation (MFN) treatment, the single undertaking, and special and differential treatment—have, for decades, offered a degree of predictability and fairness in trade. But in recent years, the institution has found itself adrift.

Indeed, the latest evidence of the WTO’s marginalization came just days ago with the announcement of a new (temporary) U.S.–China trade truce. These two giants—among the largest exporters and importers in the system, accounting together for over 40% of global trade flows—agreed to roll back some of the tariffs they had imposed on each other over the past five years. Under the new deal, U.S. tariffs on Chinese goods will drop from 145% to 30%, and China’s duties on U.S. imports will fall from 125% to 10% (Business Insider, 2025). Ironically, the deal was concluded in Geneva, the situs of the WTO, and yet it happened entirely outside its architecture.

Another recently announced “trade” deal between the US and UK—reportedly limited to token tariff changes and regulatory cooperation—has also been criticized by trade experts as not really about trade, nor reflective of the tenets of a genuine trade agreement. Notably, it appears neither reciprocal nor comprehensive in scope.

The problems at the WTO, however, long predated these onslaughts of tariff wars. The organization’s once-binding dispute system has for years now been operating sub-optimally, hobbled by the U.S. refusal to allow new appointments to its Appellate Body. Meanwhile, key functions of institutions like the United Nations Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the International Trade Centre (ITC) are being curtailed or merged under funding pressures, despite their vital roles in development and technical assistance.

Even within the UN system, there are discussions—according to leaked reform proposals—about overhauling the bureaucracy by consolidating agencies under four thematic clusters: peace and security, humanitarian affairs, sustainable development, and human rights. Notably, sustainable development is emerging as the organizing logic across UN discussions on reform.

This shift mirrors broader evolutions in global governance, including in the trade field. Trade today is governed not just by multilateral treaties, but by an ecosystem of regional deals, plurilateral arrangements, voluntary guidelines, private standards, and hybrid public-private initiatives—some of which take place under the aegis of the WTO, but many of which unfold in spite of it. We see this in the rise of plurilateral agreements such as the Joint Statement Initiatives on e-commerce and investment facilitation in the WTO. In the growth of mega-regional trade agreements (MRTAs) like the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). In the reliance on soft law, including the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) guidelines, UNCTAD principles, and sustainability certifications from private actors. And in the sheer volume of cross-cutting regulation emerging at the interface of trade, climate, data protection, and finance.

Some thinkers have argued that alternatives to multilateralism may now have arrived. For instance, Len Ishmael and her co-authors, in their recent essay “In Search of Plan B: The Rise of Like-Minded Internationalism and the Future of Global Development”, suggest that we may be entering a new era of “coalitional multilateralism.” They argue that countries with shared values and interests are increasingly bypassing global platforms in favor of smaller, more agile groupings. It’s a compelling idea. But it also underscores a problem: even like-minded alliances cannot replace the need for an inclusive forum where disagreements can be aired, compromises forged, and standards set across the full diversity of nations.

This is why I still believe in the relevance of the WTO—and why I remain involved in efforts to reform it.

Through the Remaking Trade Project, which I co-lead with Professors Dan Esty and Joel Trachtman, we have developed the Villars Framework 2.0, which sets out a practical, forward-looking agenda for WTO reform. Our starting point is the recognition that sustainable development must be more than a rhetorical goal. It must be the organizing principle of the trade system itself.

Among our proposals are calls to adopt a two-track decision-making system—preserving consensus for core legal obligations, but allowing opt-in arrangements for issues like climate, gender, or sustainability where full agreement is elusive. We advocate for broader use of plurilateral arrangements to pilot new norms, and for more coherence between regional agreements and multilateral obligations. We suggest specialized dispute resolution mechanisms for sustainability-related issues, and a strengthened WTO Secretariat with capacity to analyze cross-cutting development, social, and environmental dimensions of trade. We also propose the creation of a Sustainability Committee or Observatory within the WTO to monitor how trade policy contributes to—or detracts from—the Sustainable Development Goals.

Ours is not the only proposal. In a recent paper for the Hinrich Foundation, Keith Rockwell, former WTO spokesperson, lays out a stark assessment of the organization’s gridlock and offers a range of institutional reforms—from streamlining decision-making rules to restoring trust in the dispute system. He echoes the same urgency that Director-General Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala has repeatedly emphasized: the WTO must reform, or risk sliding into irrelevance.

Now beyond that, I’m hearing a lot about diversifying our structures of trade. In CARICOM, that would, of course, be a good thing. But again, institutionally, I think the WTO could do a much better job of embracing the work of regional economic arrangements—not just tolerating them. It should actively use its soft power, including through the Chairs Programme, and its political convening power, by inviting heads of regional organizations to the table to co-develop global trade norms, in tandem with proposals for greater international organizational cooperation.

But despite all this, I do not believe multilateralism is dead. In fact, I’ve seen proof of its resilience with my own eyes.

In April this year, I had the honour of participating in the 83rd meeting of the Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC 83) of the International Maritime Organization, representing the Caribbean. There, after days of intense and technical negotiations, we secured the adoption of a Net Zero Framework for international shipping—a legally binding agreement that will place real, enforceable constraints on the GHG emissions from the global shipping sector. It was not perfect. But it happened. And it happened multilaterally.

We’ve seen it, too, in the conclusion of the BBNJ Treaty—the historic UN agreement to protect biodiversity beyond national jurisdictions. That deal, long in the making, represents a triumph of global coordination over short-term self-interest.

Which brings me to the road ahead.

The 14th WTO Ministerial Conference, to be held in Cameroon in 2026, may be one of our last, best chances to renew and reclaim multilateral trade governance. It must not be treated as business-as-usual. Negotiations on digital trade, environmental goods, dispute settlement reform, and industrial subsidies will all be on the table. But so too should be questions of inclusiveness, development, and the future role of trade in achieving planetary sustainability.

If there is a lesson from this moment, it is that we cannot afford to give up on multilateralism. Not yet. It remains, for all its faults, the only platform where small and vulnerable countries can be heard alongside the powerful. And the only way we will ever build rules that work for people—not just for markets.

Dr Jan Yves Remy is the Director of the Shridath Ramphal Centre for International Trade Law, Policy and Services at the Cave Hill Campus, University of the West Indies.